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which will prevent the rest of the doctrine from falling into impossible inconsistency,50 tends to emphasize reliance as a determining factor in the enforcement
of promises, rather than "bargained-for" and "agreed upon" detriment or
benefit.5' In this respect, the development is not unlike that of "deceit" notions in the field of torts5 2 Both have arisen in response to modem notions of
fairness, which in many instances are incompatible with the strict rule of consideration. The initial reaction to fact situations such as that presented by the
Continental Ill. Bank case is generally one favoring recovery for the subcontractor, primarily because of the reasonable foreseeability of the reliance and resulting damage. The law probably serves its function better when it conforms
to such prevailing notions of fairness.
Nevertheless, the re-emergence of the reliance principle of enforcing promises
has met with the inertia of the courts, and there is at least some doubt today as
to whether even a court which recognizes the general applicability of Section
9o would care to hold that its protection may extend to third parties, as has
been here suggested. However, as neither the policy underlying promissory
estoppel nor the cases upholding it preclude such an application of the doctrine,
there is considerable likelihood of its development in the direction indicated. Of
course, in regard to the specific problem of providing protection for the subcontractor, the preferable alternative would be action by Congress further narrowing governmental immunity, at least in respect to subcontractors' claims for
damages.

MATERIAL WITNESSES AND "INVOLUNTARY"

CONFESSIONS
Confessions secured through the commitment of persons as material witnesses for "John Doe" proceedings may test the extent to which the Supreme
and Morals 4o (1924); LorenZen, Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts, 28 Yale
L. J. 621, 643-46 (1919); Ballantine, Is the Doctrine of Consideration Senseless and Illogical?,
ii Mich. L. Rev. 423 (1913).
s°American Law Institute, Proceedings, Vol. IV Appendix, at i2.
51 For analogous development in England of enforcement of promises on the basis of detrimental reliance, see Unger, The Twilight of Consideration, 14 Solicitor 76 (i947).
S2There has been gradual relaxation of the requirement that subjective intent to deceive
must be an element of a cause of action in deceit. judicial Recognition of the Promissory
Estoppel Section in the Contracts Restatement, 36 fl1. L. Rev. 187, x96 n. 43 (1941). It has

been suggested that promissory estoppel is a principle influencing both torts and contracts
and should not be categorized as belonging to either. Ibid., at 203; 8o U. of Pa. L. Rev.
594 (1932), noting Saunders v. Galbraith, 4o Ohio App. i55, 178 N.E. 34 (r.3i). Indeed, the
doctrine bears a striking resemblance to the action sounding in tort given at early common
law for nonperformance of a promise which another had relied upon to his detriment. Willis,
Consideration in the Anglo-American Law of Contracts, 8 Ind. L. J. 153, 159 (1932); Ames,

The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. x, 15 (i888).
A modem view favoring extension of the application of tort principles to such cases of
"nonfeasan~e" is excellently presented in Liability in Tort for the Negligent Nonperformance
of a: Promise, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 164 (1931), and this view is applied in respect to a well known
contracts case, in 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 648 (1934), noting Comfort v. McCorkle, 149 N.Y.
Misc. 826, 268 N.Y. Supp. 192 (1933).
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Court will go in interfering with state criminal procedure in order to protect
individual rights. The recent New York case of People v. Perez' indicates the
possibility that police will use this method of detaining suspects in an effort to
secure confessions.
The Supreme Court made its first pronouncement with respect to the use
of confessions in cases arising in state courts in Brovm v. Mississippi.2Beginning
with the Brown case, decided in 1936, the Court has expounded the constitutional doctrine prohibiting the use of confessions obtained under circumstances
which violate the requirements of due process of law, that is, "involuntary"
confessions.3 The Court's decisions indicate that the validity of a confession
must be tested by all the circumstances surrounding its taking;4 the Court
examines these conditions s in order to determine the existence of physical or
psychological coercion, either of which is sufficient to vitiate a confession. 6 In
N.Y. 208, 90 N.E. 2d 40 (1949), supplemental opinion rendered 300 N.Y. 647, 90
N.E . 2d 499 (ig5o), cert. den. 70 S. Ct. 561 (zg5o).
' 300

2 297 U.S.

278 (1936).

3The doctrine arose under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cases

cited note 6 infra. Although the Court has stated that the validity of a confession under the
constitutional test is independent of the test for an involuntary confession [see Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941)], the latest opinions indicate that the terms "coerced" and
"involuntary" are used as alternative words for "due process." See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49 (x94o). In using the term" 'involuntariness' doctrine" in this comment it is intended that
the due process test be understood.
This comment does not consider the problem of submitting to the jury the question whether
the circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession violate the due process clause. Although it might seem an analogous problem to that of admission, analysis indicates that the
jury is not likely to disregard a confession unless it appears untrue in an absolute sense. If the
validity of a confession is to be questioned on any other ground, the judge must apply the desired
test during a preliminary hearing prior to admission of the confession into evidence. Compare
3 Wigmore, Evidence § 861 (rev. ed. z94o); McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in
the Admissibility of Confessions, 24 Tex. L. Rev. 239, 251 (1946).
4 The Court has indicated that the issue is determined independently of the truth of the
confession. Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (194i).
sAt least two methods have been used by the Court in ascertaining the facts upon which
to base its decision of the constitutionalissue. The Court has generally accepted the determination of the state court as to what occurred unless "it [was] so lacking in support in the evidence
that to give it effect would work that fundamental unfairness which is at war with due process." Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 238 (X941). On the other hand, the Court has based
at least one of its decisions on the "undisputed testimony." Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 598
(1948). In its latest decision the Court stated: "[Tihere has been complete agreement that any
conflict in testimony as to what actually led to a contested confession is not this Court's concern. Such conflict comes here authoritatively resolved by the State's adjudication. Therefore
only those elements of the events and circumstances in which a confession was involved that
are unquestioned in the State's version of what happened are relevant to the constitutional
issue here." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51-52 (i949).
6The Supreme Court has decided the following cases involving the question whether a confession was given under circumstances which violated the due process clause (unless otherwise
indicated, the conviction was reversed): Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v.
Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (i949); Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. s96 (1948); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322
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handling these cases the Court has expressed its reluctance to interfere with
the administration of state criminal law;7 it has acknowledged, however, that
the due process clause places a duty upon it to review state convictions' and
potentially gives it broad powers for this purpose. 9
The Perez case invites analysis of a procedure not yet tested under the "involuntariness" doctrine. A murder and burglary were committed on Tuesday,
March 30, 1948. The defendant was arrested shortly after noon, Friday, April
2, after attempting to pawn some of the stolen articles. Subjected to almost continuous questioning for the next twenty-four hours, the defendant revealed
that he had, on March 3o, pawned other articles sought by the police as among
those stolen. Police recovered these items and acquired the remainder of the
loot from the defendant's uncle. During his interrogation, the defendant indicated that various people had given him the stolen property, but each "lead"
proved worthless. At noon, Saturday, April 3, the defendant was taken before
a judge, who committed him as a material witness for a "John Doe" proceeding,
in default of $50,000 bail.' He was then taken to the city prison and remained
U.S. 596 (1944) (conviction affirmed); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944), 327 U.S.
274 (1946); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (i941)
(conviction affirmed); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941); Vernon v. Alabama, 313 U.S. 547
(1941); White v. Texas, 3io U.S.53o (i94o); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (i94o ); Cantby
v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629 (I94O); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (I936).
Various factors have been considered in the cases as follows:
Actual physical abuse: Lomax, White, and Brown cases. Threatened physical abuse: Malinski and Chambers cases. Extended questioning: Watts, Turner, Harris, Haley, Ashcraft,
Ward, Lisenba, Lomax, Chambers and Cantby cases. Denial of counsel or failure to inform the
suspect of his rights: Watts, Turner, Harris, Haley, Malinski, and Chambers cases. Incommunicado holding of the defendant: Watts, Turner, Harris, Haley, Malinski, Ashcraft, White,
Chambers and Cantby cases. Deprivation of food and drink: Watts case. Denial of sleep:
Watts and White cases. Illegal detention: Watts, Turner, Harris, Malinski, Ward, White and
Chambers cases. Inhuman surroundings: Watts and Turner cases. The age, race, education
and other characteristics of the confessor: Turner, Haley, Ashcraft, Lisenba, Ward, Chambers, Cantby, and Brown cases.
7Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 n. i (i949); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 418
(1945); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
8Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 (i949).
9 Ibid., at 5o n. i.

10 Neither the opinion nor the dissent of the Court of Appeals of NewYork indicates the type
of proceeding for which the defendant was committed as a material witness. Since the statute
[New York Crim. Code (McKinney, z945) § 618(b)] requires that the person committed be
"a necessary and material witness for the people in a criminal action or proceeding pending in
any of the courts of this state," and since pending grand jury investigations are generally required as a minimum to comply with the statute [see People ex rel. Nuccio v. Warden of Eighth
District Prison, 182 N.Y. Misc. 654, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 230 (1943)], it would seem a fair inference
that some grand jury proceeding was pending at the time of the defendant's commitment as a
material witness. That proceeding might have been entitled "People v. John Doe" since such
proceedings are often used in New York. Ibid. Or, the proceeding might have been labelled
"People v. Danny Miles" since the defendant had stated prior to his commitment that he
had received the property he had pawned from a person named Danny Miles. Respondent's
brief on reargument at 5 (semble). Since the police questioned the defendant subsequent to
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there undisturbed until Monday, April 5. Beginning on Monday afternoon, the
defendant was questioned for long periods each day.I Daily interrogations continued, with the exception of Wednesday, until the defendant confessed, Friday, April 9, to the murder and burglary. At his trial the court admitted into
evidence the confession and testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding
its taking. The defendant testified that he had been beaten and deprived of
clothing, food, drink and cigarettes prior to his confession. Witnesses for the
prosecution denied this testimony. The defendant also testified that during
his commitment he had been refused permission to contact counsel by a police
captain who told him he was being held incommunicado. Although the police
captain testified, this allegation was not denied. It appeared that the defendant
had made no other request for counsel although he later talked with the assistant district attorney who had advised him of his right to counsel at the time he
was committed. The jury found the defendant guilty, and he was sentenced to
death. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the conviction, two judges
dissenting. 2 The Supreme Court denied certiorari. 3
It is doubtful whether the confession in the Perez case satisfies the standards established by the Supreme Court's decisions.14 With respect to his interrogation alone, the defendant was, according to the prosecution, "subject to
his commitment and continued to do so after the defendant had accused other persons of the
crime, the police, in effect, were holding him as a witness against an "unknown" criminal.
Further insight into the methods of the police is gained through the fact that the defendant's
wife and cousin were also held as material witnesses. Respondent's brief for reargument at 7,
"xText at note x5 infra.
12 People v. Perez, 300 N.Y. 2o8, go N.E. 2d 40 (1949). The questions on appeal involved the
admission of the confession into evidence and the failure of the trial court to give certain
charges to the jury as requested by the defendant. The court of appeals held that physical abuse
was not established so as to preclude admission, distinguishing the latest decisions of the Supreme Court on the ground that the defendants were illegally detained in those cases. The trial
court had charged that the jury might consider the confession only if found voluntary; it had
refused to charge that the jury might not convict the defendant if the confession were found
involuntary. The court of appeals held that the refusal to charge was proper because evidence
other than the confession would have justified conviction. But see Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 5o n. 2 (1949). The trial court also refused "to charge that the jury might consider" defendant's detention prior to commitment, any "unnecessary delay in arraignment, and all
circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession, in determining whether [the confessioni
was voluntary." People v. Perez, go N.E. 2d 40, 45 (1949). The court found the refusals proper
because, even though the defendant's detention prior to his commitment was not covered in the
charge, the other issues were covered in the charge and the illegal detention was not "an efficient cause of the confession." Ibid., at 46. Concerning the commitment as a material witness,
the court stated that the jury could not have found that it was a "sham" procedure for holding
the defendant because there was ample reason for such commitment at the time. The dissent
stressed the failure of the trial court to charge the jury that the defendant had a right to prompt
arraignment and that illegal detention must be considered in determining the voluntariness of
the confession.
13 People v. Perez, 70 S. Ct. 561 (195o).
'4 The denial of certiorari is inconclusive. See Frankfurter, J., in State v. Baltimore Radio
Show, 70 S. Ct. 252, 254 (195o).
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questioning for a total of thirty-two out of seventy-six hours"Is during his commitment. In the Aswraft' 6 case the defendant was questioned for thirty-six
consecutive hours and the Court found the circumstances surrounding the taking of his confession "inherently coercive."1 7 More recent decisions have emphasized the coercive aspects of protracted questioning, even though it is not continuous.,' The protracted questioning of the defendant in the principal case,
coupled with the denial of counsel by at least one police officer9 and the original
period of illegal detention," ° raises serious questions regarding the constitutionality of the admission of the confession.
The Perez case suggests a procedure which police might adopt to detain suspects. 2r A crime is committed. The policepick up one or a number of suspects.
"5Respondent's brief at 2o.
' 6 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
17Ibid., at 154.
Z8 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (i949);
Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (xg4g); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948). The Court
stressed two factors in its decision in the Ashcraft case-unremitting questioning, and the holding of the defendant incommunicado. In the Watts case the Court stressed the extended and
repeated periods of questioning while the defendant was illegally detained, held incommunicado
and accorded few decent privileges with respect to quartering, food and drink.
'9 The Court of Appeals of New York indicates that a person committed as a material witness is entitled to counsel. People v. Perez, go N.E. 2d 40, 45 (i949); see The Substance of
the Right to Counsel, 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 718 (x95o). Denial of counsel has been considered a factor in many Supreme Court decisions. Cases cited note 6 supra.
20 The Court of Appeals of New York adopted the position that even if the defendant's detention prior to his commitment as a material witness was unlawful (a point which the court did
not decide), it was irrelevant to the issue because it was not "an efficient cause of the confession." Ibid., at 46. The court's position might have been defended under the authority of Lyons
v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 5o6 (i944), if all coercive practices had terminated at the time of the
defendant's commitment as a material witness. However, the subsequent questioning of the
defendant indicates that the pressures did not cease with commitment. Thus, the period of
illegal detention ought to have been considered, under the "involuntariness" doctrine, as a part
of the totality of circumstances determining the validit of the confession. Cases cited note
6 supra. Moreover, even if the illegal detention were not a causative factor, it indicates a complete disregard of the defendant's rights and is relevant to the issue on that point. Compare
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
2 This comment is not concerned with analyzing the detention of persons who are, in fact,
material witnesses. It seems that no recent study has been made of the practice. Some guarantee that witnesses will give their testimony is certainly necessary. Lengthy detention, on the
other hand, is most undesirable. Most states regulate the treatment of witnesses for criminal
proceedings by statute. Generally, witnesses are required to post a bail bond where it appears
likely that they will abscond. See The Administration of Bail, 41 Yale LJ.293, 298 n. 41
(ig3i); Medalie, A Symposium on the Subject of Material Witnesses, 8 The Panel, No. i, at i
(Jan.-Feb., 1930); Judd, Material Witnesses, 8 The Panel, No. 3 at 7 (May-June, 1930);
American Law Institute, Code Crim. Proc., Commentary to §§ 56-58 (i93I). Failure to post
the bail bond subjects the witness to commitment. Authorities cited supra. Suggestions respecting the seasonable examination of the witness in the presence of the accused, the speeding-up
of the accused's trial and interstate exchange of witnesses have been made in order to obviate
the harsh result of lengthy detention. Medalie, op. cit. supra. With respect to the detention of
material witnesses for "John Doe" proceedings, valid reasons may also be given for the deten-

COMVIMENTS
Questioning produces no results. In order to comply with the requirements of
the material witness statute, an official appears before a grand jury and testifies
to the details leading to the belief in the existence of a crime.- Thereafter, the
suspect, having been illegally detained during this time,23 is taken before a
magistrate who sets bai'4 and, in default, commits him as a material witness for
a "John Doe" proceeding.2s The witness' commitment can continue as long as
6
the proceeding remains pending2
This procedure may be selected as an alternative to three other types of action open to police. Release of the person under suspicion is obviously unlikely.27
tion of the witness. The desire to guarantee the presence of the witness when the defendant is
apprehended speaks for this procedure where there is likelihood that the witness will abscond
or be spirited away by the guilty person. The procedure ceases to be defensible when it is used
as a means of detaining one suspected of the crime for purposes of obtaining evidence to be
used against him. Whenever a confession is obtained from such a "witness" it may be difficult
to distinguish the spurious from the genuine material witness. Text at note 40 infra.
2 It is immaterial when the official appears before the grand jury so long as there is a grand
jury proceeding against "John Doe" pending at the time of the witness' commitment. Compare People ex rel. Nuccio v. Warden of Eighth District Prison, 182 N.Y. Misc. 654,45 N.Y.S.
2d 230 (i943).
23 In practice, police might apprehend a suspect after a grand jury proceeding is pending
against "John Doe." In that event illegal detention becomes unnecessary.
24 Of course, the requirement of a bail bond does not prevent incarceration as a practical
matter. Bail may be set at a prohibitive figure. $50,ooo proved effective in the Perez case;
$25o,ooo has been held not excessive in detention of material witnesses for a murder investigation. People ex rel. Rao v. Adams, 296 N.Y. 231, 72 N.E. 2d 170 (i947).
2SThis comment is not concerned with ascertaining how many states might allow commitment of material witnesses for "John Doe" proceedings. However, it is clear that most states
will allow the commitment of material witnesses. Authorities cited note 21 supra. Generally,
statutes provide that the witness is entitled to a hearing. Medalie, op. cit. supra note 2i; Judd,
op. cit. supra note 2i; American Law Institute, op. cit. supra note 21. The witness is usually
committed only in default of bail. Authorities cited supra.
6
2

It is doubtful whether a witness can appeal his order of commitment in New York. People

v. Doe, 261 App. Div. 504, 26 N.Y.S. 2d 458 (1941) (appeal denied); In re Prestigiacomo, 234
App. Div. 300, 255 N.Y.S. 289 (932) (appeal allowed); In the matter of DiPiazzi, 234 App.
Div. 302, 255 N.Y.Supp. 291 (932) (appeal allowed). Apetitionfora writ of habeas corpuswill
be denied unless the witness can prove that a proceeding is no longer pending or that there was a
deviation from proper commitment procedures. See People ex rel. Nuccio v. Warden of Eighth
District Prison, 182 N.Y. Misc. 654, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 230 (1943). Dicta in the Perez case indicate
that the witness might secure release if he could prove that police had sufficient information
upon which to arraign him at the time of his commitment. People v. Perez, go N.E. 2d 40,46
(1949); cf. Matter of Bernoff v. Amoroso, x88 N.Y. Misc. 845, 65 N.Y.S. 2d 8io (946). Investigation as to the length of time normally consumed in effectuating the release of material
witnesses for "John Doe" proceedings would prove quite helpful. In any event, material witnesses committed for such purposes have been denied release in New York at least fifty-five
days after their commitment. People ex rel. Nuccio v. Warden of Eighth District Prison, 182
N.Y. Misc. 654, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 230 (943).
27 In practice, police have often carried on "sweeping" investigations. People who might
have some connection with, or knowledge of, many crimes are arrested and subjected to questioning and other practices in attempts to get information. Nat'l Comm'n on Law Observance
and Enforcement, Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement x62 (1931).
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Continuation of the illegal detention is also undesirable from the police viewpoint because it is one of the circumstances determinative of the voluntariness
of a confession."S Finally, the police might take the suspect before a magistrate
for a preliminary hearing with a view to having him committed as a defendant.
In the Perez case the defendant, upon his apprehension, might have been taken
before a magistrate with respect to commitment for murder and burglary or
for the possession of stolen goods.29
From the viewpoint of police and prosecuting officials, it is desirable to delay
commitment as a defendant until enough evidence has been acquired to insure
a fair chance of conviction. If they do not have sufficient evidence at the time
of commitment, they assume the risk of either obtaining such evidence subsequently or of being embarrassed by dismissal or acquittal. In practice there may
be many suspects for any one crime, and delaying commitment enables police
to seek sufficient evidence both through the suspects and through independent
investigation. Subsequent to commitment, the police may experience difficulties
in interrogating a defendant. Consequently, police have adopted various
methods of avoiding commitment.
Hitherto, illegal detention has served as one method of avoiding commitment. 30 During this period various means, ranging from questioning to physical
abuse, have been employed to get the suspect to "talk." Police and prosecuting
officials might employ such means with the incarcerated defendant. However,
committing the suspect as a defendant sharply curtails the opportunity to carry
on these activities. The defendant can then obtain counsel to protect his interests; moreover, the police may experience difficulty in attempting to remove
him from jail or to question him without his consent. Since police will generally be seeking evidence through the suspect who is illegally detained, and
protection of counsel will generally be absent during this period, the likelihood
of "coercive" practices being employed is manifest. Nevertheless, in reviewing
state cases, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to apply the McNabb3' rule
which denies admission to any confession obtained by federal officers during a
period of illegal detention.32 The Court has preferred to rest its decisions on the
28Cases cited note 6 supra.
29If the defendant in the Perez case were committed as a defendant for the possession of
stolen goods and subjected to questioning regarding the murder and burglary, one would expect
the Supreme Court to treat such questioning and any other practice employed as factors in
determining the voluntariness of any confession obtained. One might also expect the Court to
criticize police for using such a means of detaining a suspect in order to acquire a confession.
However, in the only state case in which the defendant was committed on a lesser charge and
questioned with respect to a murder, the Court mentioned the fact only in passing. Lisenba v.
California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941).
3ONat'l Comm'n on Law Observance and Enforcement, op. cit. supra note 27; cases cited
note 6 supra.
31McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
32 Justice Douglas accepted this view in concurring opinions in the latest state cases before
the Court; the majority, however, based its opinion on the totality of circumstances sur-
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totality of circumstances surrounding the taking of the confession, considering
illegal detention as a factor, but not as determinative.33
The position taken by the Court leads to serious problems because of the
probability that "coercive" methods will be employed during illegal detention
and the difficulty of establishing their use in any particular case. The suspect
will often be alone with police and prosecuting officials during this time. If there
is a dispute as to what actually occurred, its resolution by the state court precludes the Supreme Court from reviewing the evidence unless giving effect to
the state court's determination "would work that fundamental unfairness
which is at war with due process."34 But, even if the Court could decide the
"involuntariness" issue on the basis of what actually occurred, the task of
evaluating the "coerciveness" of those circumstances would still remain. Instead of resolving this issue by some arbitrary standard of "coercion," the exposure of individuals to practices so fraught with "coercion" and so much in
conflict with our "accusatorial system"3 5 of criminal procedure ought to be

condemned. Thus, the view expressed by Justice Douglas seems preferable:
"We should ...stand ready to outlaw... any confession obtained during the
6
period of the unlawful detention."3
The arguments concerning illegal detention are applicable to any type of
procedure designed to avoid commitment of a suspedt as a defendant. Commitment of suspects as material witnesses for "John Doe" proceedings is one procedure which police and prosecuting officials might adopt, at least in New
York, 37 in an attempt to detain suspects legally and to obviate the stigma attached to illegal detention. The Court of Appeals of New York indicated in the
5
Perez case that it would not allow its statute requiring prompt arraignment3
to be circumvented where "prosecuting authorities had enough information to
rounding the taking of the confession. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S.

62

(1949); Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949). The McNabb

rule, based on statutory and not constitutional interpretation, has been the object of adverse
criticism from various sources. Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the United States Supreme
Court, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 442, 452-53, 459-63 (1948); Waite, Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 679, 688-92 (i944); but see McCormick, op. cit. supra note 3, at 275.
When the question of the incorporation of this rule into the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure came before the American Bar Association, it was rejected. See Holtzoff, Institute on
Federal Criminal Rules, 29 A.B.A.J. 6o3 (1943). Congress has considered an amendment to the
Rules of Criminal Procedure which would eliminate the rule, but it has never been enacted.
See 89 Cong. Rec. 9711 (i943); 93 Cong. Rec. 1376-92 (r947).
33 Cases cited note 6 supra. There is a vast amount of literature on the subject of confessions
and also on the Supreme Court's treatment of them. See, generally, McCormick, op. cit. supra
note 3, and authorities cited therein.
34 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 238 (1941); see note 5 supra.
36Ibid., at 57.
35 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 55 (1949).

37 Commitment of material witnesses for "John Doe" proceedings is evidently a well estab-

lished practice in New York. See People ex rel. Nuccio v. Warden of Eighth District Prison,
182 N.Y. Misc. 654, 45 N.Y.S. 2d 230 (1943).
38 New York Crim. Code (McKinney, 1945) § 68(b).
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arraign [the defendant] ... but procured his commitment as a material witness so as to continue an interrogation which would have been hampered by
arraignment."39
The "involuntariness" doctrine would seem to require a similar view. The
considerations which lead one to believe that the police might adopt whatever
methods are necessary to make the illegally detained suspect confess or divulge
information, lead to the same conclusion with respect to the spurious material
witness. The intervention of a magistrate might not assist the spurious material
witness because of the existence of the same possibilities of secret interrogation,
without the assistance of counsel, as when detention is illegal. The same problems with respect to conflicting evidence, the probability that pressures will be
applied, and the task of evaluating alleged "coercion," occur in both procedures.4o Thus, as with illegal detention, the desirable rule would be one which
excludes all confessions acquired from suspects committed as material witnesses
for "John Doe" proceedings even though "coercion" might not be established
in a particular case.
The difficult question with respect to material witnesses for "John Doe" proceedings arises when attempts are made to distinguish the spurious from the
genuine witness. Distinctions have been drawn in the comparable dilemma of
separating the "party" from the witness in grand jury proceedings involving
the privilege against self-incrimination.41 However, the task of convincing the
Court of Appeals of New York that authorities have perverted the material witness commitment procedure in a particular case may be insurmountable since
the court does not forbid extended questioning of a material witness.4 Police
and prosecuting officials might always, under the view of the New York court,
maintain that their questioning was directed at a recalcitrant witness who
"knew, or might help to ascertain, the [unknown criminal]."43
39 People v. Perez, 90 N.E. 2d 40, 46 (i949).
40 Considering the aspect of "coercion" simply in terms of the type of detention of the person, it might be argued that commitment as a material witness for a "John Doe" proceeding
will be more likely to produce a confession than holding a person as a defendant. Both the defendant and the material witness may be detained in jail for an indeterminate period of time.
The defendant has simply to await his grand jury hearing and trial; any time spent in jail
during this period will be credited toward his sentence upon conviction. The material witness,
on the other hand, has to await the holding of the grand jury hearing; if he later becomes the
defendant and is convicted of the crime, the period of his commitment probably will not be
credited toward his sentence. Matter of Bernoff v. Amoroso, 188 N.Y. Misc. 845, 6,5
N.Y.S. 2d
8io (x946). Because of this lack of credit, material witnesses might be led to confess where they
believe the action is, in fact, to be directed against them at some indeterminate future time.
This pressure to confess seems manifest where a minor offense is involved; however, it becomes
extremely difficult to measure such pressure in more serious crimes.
4' Cases cited in 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2252, at 325 n. 12 (rev. ed. i94o).
42This seems odd considering that the primary purpose of a "material witness-commitment
..[is] to guarantee the presence of a witness at the trial.... ." Desmond, J., dissenting in
People v. Perez, go N.E. 2d 40, 47 (1949)43Ibid., at 45,
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The very fact that a confession is obtained from a material witness for
"John Doe" indicates a possibility that the confessor was, in fact, suspected of
the crime at the time of his commitment. Since there is no easy method of distinguishing between the spurious and the genuine material witness, this possibility alone ought to lead to the condemnation of all confessions obtained from
such "witnesses."
In any discussion of the "involuntariness" doctrine these questions arise:
What circumstances are "coercive"? What are the consequences of "coercive"
circumstances? The words "voluntary" and "involuntary" are of little assistance in answering either of these questions;44 the same is true of the phrase
"without due process of law."45
In determining the consequences of "coercive" circumstances, it is necessary
to ascertain the purpose of the doctrine. It might be designed only to eliminate
confessions which are untrustworthy.46 In this event, evidence corroborating
the truthfulness of the confession, whether a "fruit" of the confession or acquired independently, would invalidate the ground for denying admission to
the confession. On the other hand, the purpose of the doctrine might be to protect individuals from "coercive" practices, irrespective of the truth or falsity of
a confession obtained in a particular case. If this is the purpose, not only would
confessions resulting from such practices be excluded, but any evidence gained
as a "fruit" of the confession would be denied admission. Conviction under
such a rule would necessarily depend upon evidence secured independently of
the proscribed practice.
The Supreme Court has not passed on the cases which would determine the
purpose selected-either where corroborating evidence substantiates the confession or where other evidence is acquired as a "fruit" of the confession. The
Court has indicated, however, that corroborating evidence will not render a
"coerced" confession admissible.47 It thus appears that the Court is interested
in protecting individuals from "coercive" practices even though such practices
might, in a given case, produce a trustworthy confession. However, in order to
effectuate such a purpose, the Court must also be willing to deny admission to
the "fruits" of the confession.45 Otherwise police and prosecuting authorities
443

Wigmore, Evidence § 843 (rev. ed. 1940).
J., concurring in Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 6o5 (1948).
Wigmore, Evidence §§ 822, 826 (rev. ed. 1940).

45Frankfurter,
463

47The Court has stated that no "coerced confession is [admissible] under the Due Process
in it may be independently established as true." Watts v.
Clause even though statements
o

Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 5 n.

2

(1949).

48The views expressed by the Courtin the case of Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), do
not preclude the constitutional prohibition of the use of evidence gained as a "fruit" of an involuntary confession. The Court held in the Wolf case that due process protects individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures but that such protection does not include the
prohibition of admission of evidence so obtained. Admission of involuntary confessions, on the
other hand, is directly prohibited by the due process clause. If there were no corroboratlg evi-
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will not be inhibited from carrying on "coercive" practices. They will be able
to make use of the "fruits" even though the confession itself is excluded.
Even if the Court should clearly indicate the purpose to be served by the "involuntariness" doctrine and the ramifications of such a purpose in terms of the
consequences of "coercive" practices, the problem of determining what are
"coercive" practices would still remain. Because the Court has based its decisions on the totality of circumstances surrounding the taking of the particular
confession,49 the states are left to determine the meaning of each decision.
Critics of the Aslxraftso decision have been fearful lest police be forbidden
to question suspects.S' Although the Court has never denied the admissibility
of a confession merely because of police questioning, s it has reversed convictions where "coercive" interrogation appeared as a factor.53 But, as Justice
Jackson observed in his dissent in the Ashcraft case, questioning a person in
police custody is "coercive" per se. s 4 Under the present system, the police must
draw the line between "coercive" and "noncoercive" practices and trust that
their distinction agrees with that of the Court.55
dence for the confession, a distinction between the admission of such a confession and of evidence obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure might be drawn on the ground that
the former involves questions affecting the credibility of the evidence while the latter does not.
McCormick, op. cit. supra note 3, at 273. However, where the confession is corroborated to the
extent that its probable truth is established, and the "involuntariness" doctrine excludes it, no
such distinction can be argued. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 5o n. 2 (x949). Thus, the
Court in refusing to hold such a confession admissible indicates that credibility-trustworthiness-is not the objective of the "involuntariness" doctrine; it would seem, in fact, that the
Court is concerned with eliminating brutal and inhuman practices, irrespective of the truth of
the evidence which might be acquired through them. Thus, under such reasoning, all evidence
acquired through such practices would suffer the same condemnation as the confession.
If the Court is willing to exclude a confession which is substantiated by external evidence while admitting any evidence obtained as a "fruit" of the confession, the illogical result
achieved might well be criticized. If the Court is really interested only in preventing untrustworthy confessions, it would seem preferable to allow the introduction of the confession where it
is corroborated by external evidence and to allow the admission of the "fruits" of an involuntary confession. Compare 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 856-59 (rev. ed. 194o); People v. Valecek,
404 Ill. 461, 463, 89 N.E. 2d 368, 370 (r949).
49Cases cited note 6 supra.
so Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (i944).

s' Justice Jackson, dissenting in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 156 (1944); Inbau,
op. cit. supra note 32.
52 "The mere questioning of a suspect while in the custody of police officers is not prohibited
either as a matter of common law or due process." Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 6oi
(1944).
53 Cases cited note 6 supra.
54 Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 16r (1944).
ss "If the constitutional admissibility of a confession is no longer to be measured by the
mental state of the individual confessor but by a general doctrine dependent on the clock, it
should be capable of statement in definite terms. If thirty-six hours is more than is permissible,
what about 24? or 12? or 6? or i? All are 'inherently coercive.' Of course questions of law like
this often turn on matters of degree. But are not the States entitled to know, if this Court is
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Under these circumstances the Court might well consider the advisability
of adopting definite rules respecting the admission of confessions under the
"involuntariness" doctrine.s6 In considering the formulation of such rules, the
Court must, of course, be cognizant of both the interests of the community in
apprehending the criminal and the interests of society in protecting all individuals, guilty or innocent, from exposure to brutal or inhuman treatment.
7
Since pressures are too easily applied to a suspect who is illegally detained5
s
or committed as a material witness for "John Doe" proceedings, 8 the Court
might adopt rules designed to eliminate the benefits realized from such practices. All confessions obtained through such procedures could be held inadmissible.
Because illegal detention and all other means of avoiding commitment as a
defendant would become undesirable under such rules, police and prosecuting
officials might attempt to interrogate a defendant after commitment. Or, suspects might be committed on minor charges and questioned with respect to
more serious crimes.s9 In order to preclude the use of such procedures, the
Court could exclude all confessions obtained through questioning an incarcerated defendant. The Court could also indicate that the right to question
prior to such incarceration, for purposes of determining the validity of any
confession, would be governed by rules, perhaps modeled after the judges'
6
Rules of England. o
There is little doubt that such rules would interfere with the administration
of criminal law in the states; they would also interfere with the apprehension
and conviction of some criminals.6' However, if these rules were linked with a
purpose of protecting individuals from abusive practices irrespective of the
able to state, what the considerations are which make any particular degree decisive? How
else may state courts apply our tests?" Jackson, J., dissenting in Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. z43, z62 (i944).
s6The Court has stated that the objective of due process is to insure that procedures "'be
consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our
civil and political institutions"' Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936), quoting
From Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926). Within this framework the Court has
indicated that the procedures employed in criminal administration must be "accusatorial as
opposed to... inquisitorial." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (X949).
57Text at notes 30-36 supra.
s8Text at notes 36-40 supra.
s9Note 29 supra.
6oSee St. Johnston, The Legal Limitation of the Interrogation of Suspects and Prisoners in
England and Wales, 39 J-Crim. L. 89, 94 (1948). The preliminary hearing might then be made
an important part of state criminal procedure. Compare the suggestions of the New York Commission on the Administration of Justice, Second Supplemental Report 14 (1936), reprinted in
3 Wigmore, Evidence § 852, at 325 (rev. ed. 194o); Kauper, Judicial Examination of the
Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30 Mich. L. Rev. 1224 (1932); McCormick, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 277.
61Inbau, op. cit. supra note 32.
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truth or falsity of any confession obtained, they would serve as a possible means
of curbing those practices. This would assist in affording each individual suspected of a crime the rights which ought not be infringed but which have been
subjected to multifarious encroachments in the past. Moreover, the rules would
provide some objective certainty with respect to the admission of confessions
and their "fruits," and to that extent, at least, would eliminate the necessity
for omniscient insight in determining the presence or absence of "coercion" in
particular cases.
THE SUBSTANCE OF THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In federal prosecutions the courts are obligated by the Sixth Amendment to
furnish counsel for all indigent defendants,' No such inflexible guarantee is
afforded the defendant in a state prosecution. Since the Supreme Court's decision in Betls v. Brady,2 an absolute right to counsel prevails only in capital
cases. 3 Trial without counsel for a noncapital offense will not offend due process
unless, viewing the "totality of facts," the proceedings are found lacking in
fundamental fairness.4 Relevant to the question of fairness are the age, intel'U.S. Const. Amend. 6. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right...
to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." In Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
463 (I938), it was held that "[t]he Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all
criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless
he has or waives the assistance of counsel." See Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 136-37 (1947).
This provision, however, applies only to the federal courts. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,46162 (1942).
2 316

U.S. 455 (1942).

3See Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948), where justice Reed stated the
majority opinion as being that "when a crime subject to capital punishment is not involved,
each case depends on its own facts." Justice Douglas, dissenting in Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640, 68o (1948), refers to the rule that counsel must be appointed in capital cases as well
settled, citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1945);
and DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (I947). In Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 71, despite
the broad dictum, the holding was strictly limited to "a capital case, where the defendant
is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of
. ." The holding in Williams v. Kaiser,
ignorance, feeblemindedness, illiteracy, or the like..
supra, at 473, was limited to "cases of this type," and the case was of the type which was
not only capital, but which involved complex distinctions between different degrees of robbery.
In the DeMeerleer case the conclusion that due process had been denied was based not only
on the'fact that the charge was capital, but also that the defendant was very young and inexperienced, the charge complicated and the proceedings hurried. The significance of factors
other than the capital or noncapital nature of the offense is discussed in note 5 infra, in connection, primarily, with noncapital cases.
In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), it was pointed out that the previous statements of
the Court, indicating that the right to counsel in all cases came within the safeguards of the
Fourteenth Amendment, were dicta. Similarly, there have been no direct holdings that the
requirement is absolute in capital cases.
4 Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). This decision was considered by many, on as
well as off the Court, to be an unjustifiable retreat from the position previously taken by the
Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S.
233 (i936), in which cases the right to counsel was said to be fundamental. Justice Black,

